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INTRODUCTION

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was designed to introduce
competition into all aspects of the telecommunications industry. Movement
toward competition in the local exchange market has begun in a number of
states, and provisions to encourage competition are incorporated into the
1996 Act.'
Competition in terminal equipment and long distance began in the 1970s.
Most people, however, consider the date of transformation to be the breakup
of the Bell System, which occurred in the beginning of 1984. Substantial
competition, indeed, has developed in both of these markets since that time.

* Elisha Gray II Professor of Economics, MIT; Weber Temin & Co.
** Weber Temin & Co.; formerly with AT&T and Bell Labs.

1. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (1996)).
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But the local Bell companies, as well as GTE, have been forbidden from
providing long-distance service outside their local service areas. In addition,
the Bells are precluded from manufacturing telecommunications equipment.
Needless to say, movement toward opening local markets to competition
has been accompanied by heavy pressure from the Bells to concurrently open
long-distance markets to them. The controversies concerning the terms and
conditions under which all these markets can be opened succeeded in
delaying federal legislation for several years.2
Although it would appear that the issues confronting the industry today
are very different from those of over a decade ago, there are in fact many
similarities. The issues associated with cost-of-service determinations and the
associated allegations of cross subsidies, the history of which will be
discussed below, are at the center of many of today's controversies.
Similarly, the question of who will support "universal service" remains an
important one. Finally, there was much concern that the financial and market
power of the incumbent would prevent competition from developing unless
artificial advantages were given to potential new entrants. The same refrain
is heard today.
Given the magnitude of the changes that appear to be imminent and the
similarity of many of the fundamental issues to those faced over a decade
ago, it may be useful to look again at the events leading up to the 1984
divestiture, at the objectives and content of the divestiture decree, and at what
has happened since.
The purpose of the 1982 Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ) was to
cut through the Gordian knot of telecommunications in order to establish and
maintain competition in several markets. The market dominance of the Bell
System was perceived as an insuperable barrier against new entrants into the
industry. Regulatory attempts to constrain the Bell System to allow competition to grow seemed only to have impeded AT&T's operations.
In part II, the authors discuss the primary regulatory and competitive
issues that existed in the telephone industry before the MFJ that shaped its
formulation. The authors explain that the MFJ was negotiated to resolve
controversies about competitive conditions specific to the industry at that
moment, making the MFJ the best alternative among the choices then
available. Also discussed are the perceptions about the telecommunications
industry that gave rise to the MFJ and how they were incorrect in several
important respects. In particular, as is explained in part Id, the argument by
the Department of Justice (DOJ) that divestiture would cure the cross-subsidy
problem was based on a misperception of the problem. The government's

2. States, of course, were not empowered to open long-distance markets to the Bells.
Only Congress or the federal courts could do so.
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declared aim of establishing a purely regulated monopoly sector in the
telecommunications industry, segregated from the competitive parts of the
industry, was unattainable even at the time of the MFJ. Part IV returns to
the starting point by giving a brief account of events since the MFJ and their
connection with the topics discussed in this article.
It is important to emphasize that the negotiations over the MFJ and the
actual divestiture were motivated by the shared desire to remove government
regulators from the role of network engineer and to provide an industry
structure that would not interfere unnecessarily with the operation or
evolution of the public network.
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION BEFORE THE MFJ

Before the MFJ, competition in the telephone industry had been
introduced gradually over the preceding decade by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and a variety of judicial decisions. The
general form of these decisions was injunctive relief constraining AT&T
activity. These injunctions created the opportunity for competition to grow,
but at a considerable cost to efficient telecommunications provisions. No one
was happy, either within AT&T or outside.
A.

The Emergence of Interexchange Competition

Interexchange competition began in the area of private lines in the wake
of the FCC's Above 890 decree.3 AT&T responded to the entry of
independent providers of private lines by lowering prices for its private-line
services. As AT&T continued to rearrange its prices to meet private-line
competition, it soon became apparent that this was not very good business.
Switched services, however, loomed as a very profitable business, indeed.
If MCI, for example, could buy local business lines in two cities and
interconnect them using their own facilities, they could avoid the high
charges mandated by the separations process; and significantly undercut
AT&T's prices for interstate calls.
MCI, shortly followed by others, entered this market in the mid-1970s.
AT&T complained, of course, that the new entrants should pay part of the
support for local service. A compromise, the Exchange Network Facilities
for Interstate Access (ENFIA), was negotiated, under which the so-called
Other Common Carriers (OCC) paid some fraction of the support costs
implied by the separations manual and the parallel between the OCCs and
AT&T's Long Lines.4 Under this regime, the OCCs increased their traffic
3. Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 Mc, 27 F.C.C. 359 (1959).
4. Exchange Network Facilities for Interstate Access (ENFIA), 71 F.C.C.2d 440 (1979)
(mem. opinion and order).
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volumes rapidly because they were still able to significantly underprice
AT&T.
There were, however, significant drawbacks to the OCCs' service
arrangements. Because they required essentially three calls - one to the
OCC office, one between OCC offices, and one from the OCC office to the
called customer - the dialing sequence was long and complex. Customers
needed to dial the OCC number, then the called number, then a caller
identification code for billing. This procedure required a touch-tone
telephone, and it took a long time. Furthermore, the transmission quality was
often poorer than that of an AT&T call, and the carriers were subject to
caller fraud. These problems stimulated the OCCs to strive for improved
interconnection arrangements and further discounts in the prices they paid for
leased facilities and interconnection.
The OCCs also brought their
complaints from the FCC into the courtroom, both in their own antitrust suit
and the government's.
In 1978 a series of meetings was held between AT&T and the OCCs
under the aegis of the FCC. These so-called ENFIA II meetings led to a
series of proposals by AT&T as to how it would meet the demands of the
OCCs. The proposals were crystallized in a letter from Orville Wright, then
President of MCI, to William Ellinghaus, President of AT&T, setting out ten
features that the OCCs wanted. This "ten demands" letter became the focus
of much activity within AT&T. In fact, many provisions of the MFJ grew
from the proposals made in ENFIA 11.5
B.

Competition in Terminal Equipment Provision

The issue of competition in terminal equipment provision was essentially
resolved by the FCC with its equipment registration order of 1975. That
action required all telephone companies to publish interconnection standards
for terminal equipment and to provide tariffed services to people using their
own terminal equipment, which was permitted so long as the equipment was
certified to meet FCC standards.6
Although apparently a simple and straightforward solution to a difficult
problem, the FCC certification standards ran into problems as soon as new
service interfaces appeared. It was simple enough to specify a standard
telephone jack where the customer's equipment met the telephone company's
facilities when the connection was a simple two-wire connection to a copper

5. MTS and WATS Market Structure, 81 F.C.C.2d IN 130-145, at 177 (1980) (report and
third supplemental notice of inquiry and proposed rulemaking).
6. Proposals for New or Revised Classes of Interstate and Foreign Message Toll Service
(MTS) and Wide Area Telephone Service (WATS), 53 F.C.C.2d 221 (1975) (recommended
first report and order).
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pair. With the evolution of digital transmission systems and more complex
data services, questions arose as to what equipment, if any, on the customer's
premises could still be owned and maintained by the telephone company.
The answer that finally came down was "none," a solution which, although
it had the merit of simplicity, made the provision and maintenance of some,
particularly data, services difficult and costly. This solution also required the
definition of a whole set of interface standards for which no one else in the
world saw the need.
This so-called Network Channel Terminating Equipment (NCTE)
argument went on for a number of years.7 This argument occupied and
distracted many of Bell Labs' most gifted scientists and engineers for years,
and ended being a solution that seriously restricted their attempts to design
new services. NCTE was the first example of artificially introduced
boundaries and constraints in search of competitive equity. It was hardly a
roaring success.
C.

Keeping Up with Enhanced Services

At the same time, the FCC was struggling to distinguish between
telecommunications services, which were regulated and principally provided
by the telephone companies, and data processing services, which were
unregulated and were provided by others.' The problem was that not only
was the technology converging, but so were the service descriptions. Thus,
some telecommunications services contained features that had strong data
processing-like elements, while data processing services often had some
telecommunications-like elements.
The FCC's solution, Computer II, was a pseudo-divestiture that required
AT&T to create a separate, unregulated subsidiary for the provision of what
were dubbed "enhanced services."9 This separation of AT&T's activities
was done partly to avoid the restrictions of the 1956 antitrust decree,' 0 and
partly to minimize the possibilities for cross-subsidization. It was further
decreed that information concerning services to be tariffed by the telephone
companies had to be withheld from the separate subsidiary until all potential

7. Petitions Seeking Amendment of Part 68 of the Commission's Rules Concerning
Connection of Telephone Equipment, Systems and Protective Apparatus to the Telephone
Network, 94 F.C.C.2d 5 (1983).
8. AT&T was excluded from the provision of such services under the 1956 Consent
Decree. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., No. 82-0192 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 1956).
9. Amendment of § 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 [hereinafter Computer I], modified on recons., 84 F.C.C.2d
50 (1980),further modified on recons., 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981), aff'd sub nom. Computer &

Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
10. See Western Elec., No. 82-0192.
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customers for such services were informed."
The practical effect of Computer II was to shut down all communication
between the two entities. In fact, it was probably more restrictive than a full
divestiture would have been. Engineers at Bell Labs who were designing
new services that involved "enhanced" elements were not allowed to talk to
those designing "basic" services, except in the presence of a lawyer.
The net effect of this regulatory initiative was to stifle the development
of "enhanced" services and to make the provision of ordinary telecommunications services more difficult in all but the most primitive cases. As
a result, "enhanced" services never achieved their predicted success.
One of the most notable effects of Computer II was the delay in the
introduction of publicly available centralized voice mail, or call-answering
These services, commonly available today from telephone
services.
companies, provide service similar to that of an ordinary home answering
machine, but with substantially more features. Under the Computer II ruling,
such services were in the "enhanced" category because they involved the
storage of customer information - voice messages."
Bell Labs developed a system to provide such a service, which was
designed as an adjunct to the No. 1 ESS switching machine. It had been
installed in Philadelphia for a trial period just before the FCC's Computer II
decision. Because the system was so intimately intertwined with the basic
switching function, the system could not be spun off into a separate
subsidiary. After a request for waiver was denied, the equipment was
removed from service. Thus, a substantial investment in a useful new
technology was wasted, and the public was denied the benefits of such
services for over a decade.
The Computer H decision was the second attempt to resolve a problem
of a mixture of competitive and monopoly services by drawing arbitrary lines
and imposing restrictive rules. The decision turned out to be counterproductive, and fortunately, the FCC reversed course during the late 1980s.
Il.

A.

THE MFJ'S STRUCTURAL SOLUTION TO CROSS SUBSIDIES
WAS BASED ON MISTAKEN ASSUMPTIONS

The Division Between Local Exchange and Interchange
Services Is Necessarily an Arbitrary One

Meanwhile, the government's antitrust lawsuit against AT&T was also
moving toward a climax; no one doubted the interaction between the suit and
the activities described above. Although the lawsuit had initially focused on

11. See Computer 1, supra note 9, T 246, at 480.
12. Id. 98, at 421.
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equipment supply, 3 the focus gradually shifted to long-distance services. 4
As is inevitable in the course of such a proceeding, numerous proposals for
settlement were put forth. They included token divestitures, and were filled
out with injunctive prohibitions, requirements for arm's-length dealings
within the organization, and all of the legal apparatus that had proven so
counterproductive in Computer II. It was the judgment of some of the key
operational people that the business could rapidly become unmanageable
under the kinds of constraints being proposed.
AT&T management tried to hold the Bell System's vertically integrated
structure intact during its negotiations with the DOJ and congressional
officials to end the government lawsuit. AT&T and the DOJ discussed at
length several possible agreements that would leave the Bell System intact
and that contained numerous and complicated injunctions governing pricing,
standards of interconnection, procurement practices, and internal sales
limitations on Western Electric. AT&T selected a top network engineer,
Joseph Weber, to evaluate the effects that these highly secretive proposals
would have on the operation and evolution of the network. Given the
extensive history of failed regulatory efforts to engineer the network on
behalf of competition, it is not surprising that Weber concluded, in a
memorandum provided to AT&T's Chairman by its General Counsel, "I think
at this point the warning must be raised that we may be heading into a
massive straightjacket that will make the network almost inoperable in the
future and weigh this against the penalties to the public and to ourselves of
some degree of divestiture."' 5
By instituting a structural solution to the problems of the telecommunications industry, the MFJ appeared to offer an alternative path with none
of the problems associated with injunctions on AT&T. The Bell System
would be split into two parts: one competitive, and the other a regulated
monopoly. 6 There would no longer be a need for injunctions because the
enjoined activities would now be the province of separate firms. In his
handwritten note accompanying the first draft of the M4FJ sent to AT&T,
Assistant Attorney General William Baxter announced, "Everything is
negotiable except the concept of separating the local exchange function and
then confining the BOCs [Bell Operating Companies] to local exchange
functions."17

13. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., No. 82-0192 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 1956).
14. See, e.g., Above 890, supra note 3.
15. PETER TEMIN, THE FALL OF THE BELL SYSTEM: A STUDY IN PRICES AND POLITICS

260 (1987).
16. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., CA No. 82-0192, 1982 WL 1882, at *1
(D.D.C. Aug. 24, 1982).

17. Memorandum from William F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Howard J. Trienens, Vice President and General Counsel of AT&T,
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By this structural realignment, Baxter aimed to minimize injunctive
interference with telephone company operations by reducing the opportunity
and incentive for cross subsidies. As he said in testimony before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, "If one argues for divestiture, one argues that the crosssubsidy problem is terribly important,. . . and that regulatory supervision is
unwanted and more deregulation is possible."' 8 In other words, divestiture
would solve the terribly important cross-subsidy problem, eliminating the
need for regulatory supervision.
But where was the division between the local exchange function and
interexchange service that Baxter said was nonnegotiable? When his abstract
statements came to be specified in a rule or formula, it became apparent that
the network did not have natural dividing lines corresponding to the legal
boundaries of states or companies.
For example, one critical issue arose over the so-called Class 4 switch.
Was this the highest level local switch or the lowest level interexchange
switch? The switch handled both kinds of traffic in the integrated network.
Baxter wanted to divide the network above these switches, in effect assigning
them all to the BOCs. AT&T resisted, at Weber's insistence, on the grounds
that this division would cripple their operations while saddling the BOCs
with equipment they did not need. Baxter eventually agreed that network
efficiency was more important than abstract safeguards for equal access.
There was a clear understanding between the DOJ and AT&T that the
technical operation of the separated networks, particularly the BOC networks,
should be constrained and interfered with as little as possible. The
interexchange restriction - that no BOC shall "provide interexchange
telecommunications services," - was carefully phrased to relate only to the
service being provided and not to the technical means of providing it. 9
The negotiations leading up to this formulation made clear that the MFJ was
not to constrain or degrade the way in which the network was designed or
engineered.
The decree clearly allowed a call originating and terminating in the same
Local Access and Transport Area (LATA), the geographical boundary within
which a BOC was allowed to provide telecommunications service, to be
routed through a tandem switch in another LATA.20 So long as the call
originated and terminated on the same LATA, the BOC could route the call

transmitting a draft of the divestiture decree (Dec. 21, 1981) (quoted in TEMIN, supra note 15,
at 269).
18. Department of Justice Oversight: U.S. v. AT&T Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary,97th Cong. 27 (1981) (testimony of William F. Baxter).
19. Western Electric, 1982 WL 1882, at *2.
20. Id. at *3.
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anywhere without violating the decree.2
Similarly, the location of the point of demarcation described within the
"exchange access" definition clearly shows that the entire local network was
to be under the control of the BOCs, who were to deliver traffic to the
interexchange carriers at what came to be known as points of presence
(POP).22 Under the "equal price per unit" rule, the BOCs had the right to
determine whether to route interLATA traffic directly from an interexchange
carrier to the end office, or to route it via an intermediate access tandem on
the grounds of network efficiency.2 3
Several issues were only settled after the MFJ was adopted, in the
administration of the Plan of Reorganization. One key issue in the
divestiture was the size and makeup of the LATAs. Although the LATAs
were originally predicated simply on the design of Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Areas (SMSA) defined by the Census Bureau, it soon became clear
that much more was at issue. The final design was drawn based on a welter
of geographical, economic, and political considerations - an attempt to
balance the need to maximize the markets open to competition with the need
for efficient operation within areas with high communities of interest. Thus,
even in this fundamental delineation of the boundary between BOC and
AT&T activities, a clear distinction between local and long distance simply
did not exist. The ultimate definition was the result of a negotiation, which
is not very satisfactory for those seeking intellectual purity.
Once the LATAs were fixed, the Class 4 switches could be allocated as
well. The architecture of the system, in other words, was determined by the
variety of considerations that entered into the LATA negotiations. The
switches were allocated in general on the basis of predominant use, but even
here the guidelines were far from clear. The final allocation was based on
hard bargaining between AT&T and the nascent regional companies, and
intervention by the decree court.
Another difficult issue was raised by the "800 data base," which provided
routing information for all 800 calls. The BOCs argued that they needed the
database to provide equal access for 800 service, while AT&T insisted that,
since it was used principally for interLATA traffic, it should belong to
AT&T. After several years of wrangling, AT&T emerged as the owner, but
the BOCs began development of a system to perform similar functions.
As these examples illustrate, the ideology of the MFJ was too abstract to
deal with the actual conditions of the Bell System. Baxter maintained his

21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id. This explicit understanding had been reached during negotiations over a
Senate bill that was being formulated just before the settlement, some provisions of which
became part of the decree.
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position that divestiture was the best way to eliminate cross subsidies, but the
negotiations between Baxter and AT&T made sure that the fault lines along
which the Bell System was split did not interfere excessively with the
efficient operation of the network. Negotiations over the actual division
continued long after the wording of the MIFJ was set. Political considerations
and the first stirrings of independence by the regional Bell companies further
muddied the waters, taking the actual divestiture effected by the MFJ further
away from Baxter's pristine conception.
B.

The Appearance of Cross Subsidies Depends on
Arbitrary Accounting Conventions

The issue of cross-subsidization in telecommunications, so critical in
shaping the structure of the MFJ, is an old one. It arose initially in the
context of state and federal jurisdiction. The issue was raised in many FCC
proceedings in the 1970s and arose first in the period between the two World
Wars in the context of the integrated Bell System. The issue was whether
local rates, within state jurisdiction, were subsidizing long-distance rates
which were at that time regulated loosely at the federal level. The issue was
conceptualized as a choice between two kinds of cost accounting: station-tostation or board-to-board. In the former, a long-distance call is conceptualized as going from an end user (a station) to another end user. In the
latter, the call is seen as going from one local operating company to another,
POP to POP. AT&T traditionally had used the former; the Supreme Court
ruled that regulators should use the latter, but without forcing a change in
rates.24
The FCC thereafter used the concept of cross subsidies within the Bell
System to refer to deviations from its preferred method of cost accounting.
But telecommunications is an activity with very high fixed costs and plant
that is used for many different activities. As is well known, there is no
uniquely correct way to allocate fixed costs to units of production, and there
is no uniquely correct way to allocate joint costs to disparate activities. The
FCC therefore indicated its preferred accounting procedure without being able
to show that this procedure was closer to "actual" costs than many others.
The choice of station-to-station accounting was a political and legal one.
In fact, the FCC often changed the accounting conventions of station-tostation accounting, revealing that the decision about how to allocate
accounting costs was not a decision about the use of resources. The wellknown periodic shifts of plant from intrastate to interstate jurisdiction
between World War II and the divestiture show beyond a shadow of a doubt

24. Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133, 151 (1930); Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell
Tel. Co., 3 F. Supp. 595 (N.D.Ill. 1933), rev'd, 292 U.S. 151 (1934).
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that the accounting conventions were the result of political decisions, not
rational economic calculations.
This political process thoroughly confused the process of accounting cost
allocations within the Bell System. This confusion generated further
confusion. AT&T was required by the FCC to provide cost justifications for
its tariffs. Starting with its TELPAK tariff in 1961, AT&T proposed a
variety of new tariffs to respond to FCC decisions introducing competition
into various segments of telecommunications. The FCC found itself unable
to certify any of these tariffs as lawful in the twenty years that followed.
Some of the tariffs were disallowed; others were allowed to go into effect by
default. But the FCC never said that a new AT&T tariff was "lawful," and
it never removed the threat of reconsideration, accompanied by possible
retroactive compensation from these tariffs.
The FCC raised the issue of cross subsidies in the context of AT&T's
proposed new tariffs. The FCC argued in each case that the proposed prices
differed from the costs calculated under the existing conventions of cost
allocation. When the rules for cost allocation changed, as noted above, the
alleged cross subsidy changed as well.
These cross subsidies became a point of dispute in the antitrust suit
against AT&T. The Bell System, unable for twenty years to issue lawful
tariffs, was accused of subsidizing its competitive interexchange services
from its monopoly local services. This was one of the issues that would
have been adjudicated if the case had not been settled.
Cross subsidies also figured prominently in the regulatory and congressional measures being implemented and debated while the antitrust case was
in progress. Many of the injunctions proposed to be imposed on the Bell
System were designed to minimize cross subsidies, as defined by the FCC.
The division of facilities and manpower into separate units, the requirements
to set up fully separated subsidiaries, and the whole panoply of operating
rules detailed above were tributes to the FCC's arbitrary definition of cross
subsidies. As noted above, the actual and proposed separations within AT&T
were massive impediments to efficient operation.
An understanding of the impact of these arcane accounting conventions
is important for three reasons. First, the arbitrariness of the conventions
shows that the issue of cross-subsidization is not a problem that has ever
been solved in terms of the costs of distinct activities. Instead, cross
subsidies have been a creature of accounting conventions. Second, while
judicial decisions and industry practice moved increasingly toward the
station-to-station convention before divestiture, the MFJ broke up the Bell
System along board-to-board lines. The very concept of what a cross subsidy
was changed radically once the MFJ was adopted. Third, it cannot be
surprising that this confusion continued, since the MFJ could not and did not
eliminate either cross subsidies or accusations of cross subsidies in

212

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 8

telecommunications.
Gerald Brock, a former Chief of the Common Carrier Bureau at the FCC,
reported that discovery of the government's confusion and error did not take
long: "As the FCC developed the access charge plan during 1982 and 1983,
it became clear that massive subsidies had been flowing from long distance
to local service. The FCC/state regulator/AT&T view on that question was
generally correct and the DOJ/MCI view wrong. 25 Subsequent rate
movements confirmed this conclusion.26
C.

The MFJ Treats Cross Subsidies in a Confused and
Inconsistent Manner

The MFJ was designed to eliminate the opportunity and incentive for
cross subsidies. Its primary provision was, of course, divestiture. It divided
interexchange and intraexchange service into the provinces of distinct sets of
companies. There would be no opportunity for the new AT&T, which was
responsible for interexchange services, to receive subsidies from the BOCs,
which were confined to providing local services.
It is hard to make this statement in 1997. Thirteen years after divestiture,
the motivating reasons behind the DOJ's decision to seek divestiture seem to
come from another world. The interexchange access fee is widely regarded
as a subsidy to local service.2 7 The issue today is whether Teleport, then
MCI, and then perhaps AT&T can manage to evade the requirement to pay
this subsidy.
What has changed is the conceptualization of the telecommunications
industry. By breaking up the Bell System along board-to-board lines, the
MFJ prompted a new board-to-board view of the marketplace. Putative cross
subsidies vanished into thin air. It is time that this highly mistaken view of
cross subsidies is acknowledged and understood as a principal motivation
behind divestiture and the line-of-business restrictions that the MFJ contains.
The MFJ did not stop at the division of the industry into local and
interexchange components.
It also restricted the BOCs to furnishing
intraexchange telephone services, of which they were the monopoly providers
at the time. 28 This provision, section II(D)(3), continued the tradition of the
1956 Consent Decree that the MFJ modified. It attempted to sidestep the

25. GERALD
(1994).

W. BROCK, TELECOMMUNICATIONS

POLICY FOR THE INFORMATION AGE 296

26. Peter Temin, Cross Subsidies in the Telephone Network After Divestiture, 2 J. REG.
ECON. 349 (1990).
27. ROBERT W. CRANDALL, AFTER THE BREAKUP: U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN A
MORE COMPETITIVE ERA 32-33 (1991).
28. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., CA No. 82-0192, 1982 WL 1882, at *2
(D.D.C. Aug. 24, 1982).
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issue of cross subsidies by eliminating the opportunity for a BOC to cross
subsidize a competitive activity. If the BOC did not have any competitive
activities, it could not cross subsidize them.
This simple model ran afoul of another widespread assumption of a
decade ago. It was widely believed that the BOCs would be the poor
relations of the telecommunications industry. Given where the dividing line
between AT&T and the BOCs was drawn, the result, as noted above, of
complex bargaining rather than natural fault lines, was that the BOCs were
thought to be restricted to the stagnant part of the telecommunications
business.
The IFJ therefore contained several provisions to mitigate this suspected
fate. Among the amendments imposed by the decree court was the
following: BOCs were allowed to provide, although not to manufacture,
customer premises equipment (CPE).29 No one thought that CPE supply
was a monopoly. Another amendment awarded the Yellow Pages to the
BOCs. 30 Again, no one claimed that the supply of directories was a natural
monopoly. The reasoning of the decree court was simply that the BOCs
needed extra revenue. This argument, of course, conflicts with the larger
claim that local services were cross subsidizing long-distance services; the
argument represented an early switch to board-to-board thinking. Here, cross
subsidies were desirable.
Finally and most contentiously, the decree court introduced the waiver
process by which BOCs could offer other competitive services. 3' This was
the wrinkle that allowed the nose of the competitive camel into the monopoly
tent of the BOCs. The requirement of seeking a waiver to enter any
nontelecommunications business was abandoned altogether in 1987, after the
first and only triennial review, and the MFJ as it stood when the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was passed had only faint echoes of its original
intellectual underpinnings.
IV.

THE TRACK RECoRD

In practical terms, what has been the effect of the divestiture on
telecommunications services in the United States? Since the divestiture
decree, the MFJ carefully divided telecommunications services between
terminal equipment, long-distance service, and local service; the authors use
the same breakdown in the discussion that follows.

29. Id. at *6.
30. Id. at *7.
31. See id.
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Terminal Equipment

It is quite clear that there have been massive improvements in both the
capability and cost-effectiveness of telecommunications terminal equipment.
Although many, if not most, of these improvements were made possible by
new technologies, it is not at all clear that these improvements would have
permeated the marketplace so quickly if terminal equipment had not been
provided competitively by a multiplicity of providers. These improvements
are not strictly a result of divestiture, since the terminal equipment monopoly
had been eliminated by the FCC in 1976. But the development of alternative
supplies of terminal equipment certainly accelerated after 1984 as more
people became aware of the changes taking place in the industry.
B.

Long-Distance (Interstateand InterLATA Intrastate) Service

The long-distance market became fully competitive after 1984. While the
long-distance market was almost monopolized by AT&T before divestiture,
MCI and others began to offer long-distance service in competition with
AT&T in the 1970s. AT&T remains the largest long-distance provider, but
there is vigorous competition in all segments of that market. This competition has stimulated a wide variety of new service offerings and pricing
arrangements, some of which were made possible by new technologies. It
also stimulated AT&T to upgrade its network to fiber facilities earlier than
had been planned in order to match Sprint's perceived service quality.
Although prices have dropped substantially, most, if not all, of the
broadly applied price reductions have been a pass-through of the reductions
in exchange access charges levied by the local telephone companies.32
There have been substantial reductions in prices for large users, where
competition is most intense, but competition in residential markets has taken
the form of innovative pricing plans rather than across-the-board reductions.
The result of all this is that margins apparently remain high, which of course
provides the BOCs with an even greater incentive to shed the shackles
imposed by the MFJ.
C. Local Service
The picture for local service is quite different. It was anticipated at the
time of the MFJ that local exchange service would remain a monopoly for
some years to come, and the issue of competition in the local exchange was
simply not addressed. This issue was left to the regulators, who by and large

32. William E. Taylor & Lester D. Taylor, PostdivestitureLong-Distance Competition in
the United States, AM. ECON. REV., May 1993, at 185-90.

19971

THE MODIFICATION OF FINAL JUDGMENT

prohibited local competition as being contrary to the public interest. Only
in 1995 was local service competition authorized in a few jurisdictions. It
has been generally opposed by the BOCs, who insist that they should not
have to face competition in their markets if they are unable to compete in the
long-distance market.
D.

The Next Wave

As noted in part II of this article, competition in the long-distance market
was initially stimulated by the existence of clear and substantial subsidies to
new entrants. The portion of the cost of Bell's long-distance service that was
allocated to local operations was a substantial part of the total cost of longdistance service, and the new entrants had to pay only a fraction of this
portion of cost. Terminal equipment, on the other hand, received no such
subsidy, and that market became, if anything, more competitive than long
distance.
Predictably, the introduction of competition into local exchange markets,
is bringing with it the same demands for subsidy that MCI and others made
in the 1970s when they were attempting to enter the interstate long-distance
business. The players, of course, are different. Now it is AT&T who is
arguing that the telephone companies, led by AT&T's own offspring, should
allow AT&T to resell their local services at substantial discounts. In a sense,
AT&T is asking that the Bells allow it to put the AT&T logo on Bell
services, for which it will pay a price that is heavily discounted from the
retail rate. AT&T will then presumably be able to resell these services at
retail for less than Bell, thus creating "competition" in that market.
MCI in the 1970s and the potential new entrants to local exchange in the
1990s were, and are, using similar arguments. They all assert that prices
should be set at "cost" and then make lengthy arguments to show why the
prices of the services they wish to buy and resell are far above "cost," and
hence, are unreasonable barriers to competitive entry. The incumbents, then
and now, respond that the prices for these very same services are below
"cost" and therefore cannot be sold at a discount.
All parties bring many experts to the witness stand to support their
positions, but the fact is that there are no uniquely determinative "costs" for
these services. The nature of telecommunications is such that many services
rely on common facilities, and the "costs" of any one service depend on the
allocations of these common costs, which are of course arbitrary. The fact
that the problem of allocating joint costs has no solution does not deter those
whose self-interest is at stake from making the arguments. The argument has
been going on since the 1960s, as described in part II. There is no sign of
its abatement.
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One would think that these demands, that is, MCI's original demands and
AT&T's current ones, and the essentially meaningless underlying arguments
put forth by all parties would by now have been dismissed as nonsense. But
the arguments seem to appeal to a school of thought that says that the
incumbent is so strongly entrenched in these monopoly markets that artificial
subsidies, such as these, are required in order to establish a competitive
market. There is no doubt that artificial subsidies worked for long distance.
It is also true, as noted above, that terminal equipment became competitive
without such assistance.
The question is whether potential new entrants in the local exchange
telecommunication market, which are typically large companies like AT&T,
would require such subsidies if a competitive local exchange market is to be
created. There may be enough different approaches being taken in the
various states so that this question will, in time, be answered.
V.

CONCLUSION

This historical review shows that the MFJ was a response to the peculiar
conditions in the telecommunications industry of 1981. The MFJ responded
to ideology that was strong at the time but has since been abandoned. It
aimed to cut through myriad injunctive barriers that the FCC had scattered
through the Bell System but that now are long gone. The MFJ was attractive
in 1981 partly because it undid previous government actions. Needless to
say, these conditions are no longer present today.
Although the MFJ restructured the telecommunications industry, it has
been unsuccessful in its attempt to impose rationality on the industry and lay
various specters of the old Bell System to rest. Even though Assistant
Attorney General Baxter said that the limiting of the BOCs to local exchange
functions was nonnegotiable, it was in fact negotiated at length and on many
dimensions. The division between local exchange and interexchange service
was not clear, and the BOCs were given the Yellow Pages and the
opportunity to file waiver applications for other activities. As a result of the
blurred line, some of the issues in the antitrust case against AT&T have been
kept alive.
While competition in certain segments of the telecommunications
industry has increased, the goal of reducing regulation has proven elusive.
Also, the goal of eliminating the opportunity and incentive for cross
subsidies, Baxter's "terribly important problem," was missed at the outset by
the actual words of the MFJ as finally negotiated and agreed upon, and it has
since been forgotten in the continuing confusion engendered by the unclear
boundaries between activities. Technological and market boundaries typically
shift faster than does regulation.
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Arguments about cross subsidies, however, appear more durable than
technology and market boundaries. The contest over local competition today
is being fought on the same intellectual battlefield on which the contest over
interexchange competition was fought two decades ago. The imperfections
of the MFJ contributed to the continuation of old debates.
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